New Research: Election cycles in natural resource rents: Empirical evidence

Jeroen Klomp ([sites.google.com] University of Wageningen) Jakob de Haan ([rug.nl] University of Groningen) write on

Election cycles in natural resource rents: Empirical evidence

Abstract

We examine whether governments’ natural resource rents are affected by upcoming elections and if so, whether the incumbent uses these additional rents for re-election purposes. Estimates of a dynamic panel model for about 60 countries for 1975-2011 suggest that elections increase natural resource rents. The incumbent uses these rents for expanding public spending and reducing taxes before elections. However, these electoral cycle effects are statistically significant only in young democracies. Our results also suggest that election effects are stronger in countries with limited access to free media, limited political checks and balances, and a presidential system.

Forthcoming in Journal of Development Economics, available here [sciencedirect.com]

New Research: On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies

New research from Raouf Boucekkine ([greqam.fr] University of Aix-Marsaille) , Fabien Prieur ([tse-fr.eu], Toulouse School of Economics), Klarizze Puzon (Aix-Marseille School of Economics)

On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies

Abstract

We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite's redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite's policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings.

Forthcoming in European Economic Review, Available here [sciencedirect.com].

New Research: Sovereignty, the ‘resource curse’ and the limits of good governance: a political economy of oil in Ghana

Jon Phillips [kcl.ac.uk], Elena Hailwood and Andrew Brooks [kcl.ac.uk], all King's College London

write on

Sovereignty, the ‘resource curse’ and the limits of good governance: a political economy of oil in Ghana

Abstract:

The idea of a resource curse has influenced policy makers and led to calls for good governance to avoid the pitfalls of oil sector development. Through discussion of Ghana’s recent insertion into the global political economy of oil, this paper describes the limits of the resource curse framing and associated liberal institutional management approaches to the inherently political nature of oil exploration and production. The paper describes ways in which sovereignty has been exercised both in opposition to and in support of foreign capital, and the role of discourses of ‘good governance’ in structuring the material politics of resource access.

Published in Review of African Political Economy, available here [tandfonline.com].