Tuesday, April 19, 2016

OxCARRE Seminars this term

Trinity Term 2016
OxCarre Seminar Series
***Tuesdays at 14.30hrs***
Seminar Room C
Manor Road Building, Manor Road

3 May – 2.30pm Seminar Room C
Speaker: Paul Scott (University of Toulouse)
Title: Dynamic Discrete Choice Estimation of Agricultural Land Use

17 May  -2.30pm Seminar Room C
Speaker:  Pramila Krishnan (Cambridge)
Title:  The Natural Resource Curse Revisited: Theory and evidence from India

31 May – 2 seminars
**1.00pm  - Seminar Room D
Speaker:  Nicolas Merener (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires)
Title: Output Value Risk for Commodity Producers: the Uncertain Benefits of Diversification

**5.30pm – Seminar Room A
Speaker:  Joseph Aldy (Harvard)
Title: TBC

14 June – 2.30pm Seminar Room C
Speaker:  Martin Weitzman (Harvard)

Title: Can Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality?

See further at the OxCARRE website

Friday, April 8, 2016

New Research: Government size, misallocation and the resource curse

Radek Stefanski [weebly.com](University of St. Andrews and external research associate of OxCARRE) writes on

Government size, misallocation and the resource curse
I do two things in this paper: First, using a panel of macro cross-country data, I demonstrate that the share of public sector employment is greater in resource-rich countries than in resource-poor countries even controlling for the size of other non-traded sectors. Second, I construct and calibrate a small, open economy model with two production sectors and a government sector in which (optimally) higher government employment shares emerge as a consequence of windfall-induced labor reallocation. I then use a model to compare the optimal and observed size of government in order to obtain an estimate of the extent of government misallocation and the impact it has on welfare and productivity.
Chapter available here [bcentral.cl],

published in Commodity Prices and Macroeconomic Policy, edited by Rodrigo Caputo and Roberto Chang. Santiago, Chile. 2015. Central Bank of Chile. See here [bcentral.cl].


Thursday, April 7, 2016

NRGI launches site with project level payments data

The Natural Resource Governance Institute [resourcegovernance.org] (NRGI) has launches a new website resourceprojects.org, providing project level payment data with the aim to increase transparency in the natural resources sector across the world.
ResourceProjects.org is an open-source repository of data on oil, gas and mining projects across the world. It provides a platform to collect, display, download and search extractive project information using open data. It aims to harvest data on project-by-project payments to governments—based on recent mandatory disclosure legislation in the EU, U.S. and Canada as well as EITI reports—and link it to associated information about the project from a variety of sources. The platform will make it easier for journalists, CSOs, researchers and government officials to search, access and download relevant data.
Have a look here [resourceprojects.org] and further explanation here.

FT: Angola goes to IMF

The FT reports:
Angola becomes latest oil producer seeking IMF bailout
Angola has requested a bailout from the International Monetary Fund that could be worth more than $1.5bn, making the OPEC member the latest oil-producing country to seek international help to cope with the fallout from low crude prices.


 

Thursday, March 31, 2016

The company that systematically corrupted the global oil industry

Fairfax Media and The Huffington Post publish a 3-part investigative story on corruption on global scale. The first part deals with a Monaco based corporate fixer of contracts for western companies in the Arab world, the second on the caspian region.
A massive leak of confidential documents has for the first time exposed the true extent of corruption within the oil industry, implicating dozens of leading companies, bureaucrats and politicians in a sophisticated global web of bribery and graft.

Read on here and here [theage.com.au] and follow links under the articles for more details.

Friday, March 25, 2016

New Research: Election cycles in natural resource rents: Empirical evidence

Jeroen Klomp ([sites.google.com] University of Wageningen) Jakob de Haan ([rug.nl] University of Groningen) write on

Election cycles in natural resource rents: Empirical evidence

Abstract
We examine whether governments’ natural resource rents are affected by upcoming elections and if so, whether the incumbent uses these additional rents for re-election purposes. Estimates of a dynamic panel model for about 60 countries for 1975-2011 suggest that elections increase natural resource rents. The incumbent uses these rents for expanding public spending and reducing taxes before elections. However, these electoral cycle effects are statistically significant only in young democracies. Our results also suggest that election effects are stronger in countries with limited access to free media, limited political checks and balances, and a presidential system.

Forthcoming in Journal of Development Economics, available here [sciencedirect.com]

Wednesday, March 16, 2016

New Research: On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies

New research from Raouf Boucekkine ([greqam.fr] University of Aix-Marsaille) , Fabien Prieur ([tse-fr.eu], Toulouse School of Economics), Klarizze Puzon (Aix-Marseille School of Economics)

On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies

Abstract
We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite's redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite's policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings.
Forthcoming in European Economic Review, Available here [sciencedirect.com].