Poverty, Growth and the Demand for Energy

New paper presented at the IIES birthday party:
Most of the future growth in energy use is forecast to come from the developing world. Understanding the likely pace and specific location of this growth is essential to inform decisions about energy infrastructure investments and to improve greenhouse gas emissions forecasts. We argue that countries with pro‐poor economic growth will experience much larger increases in energy demand than countries where growth is more regressive. When poor households’ incomes go up, their energy demand increases along the extensive margin as they buy energy‐using assets for the first time. We also argue that the speed at which households come out of poverty affects their asset purchase decisions...

Natural Resource Transparency

Daniel Kaufmann at Brookings: In fact, our own data and research suggests that in the long run there is up to a 300 percent development to citizens dividend from increased transparency, accountability and improved governance. In particular, improved governance can contribute to a threefold rise in incomes and two-thirds decline in infant mortality.
Read it all here.

Africa, oil and the West

The Economist: BARELY a month goes by without a new oil discovery in Africa. Only five of the continent’s 55 countries are neither producing nor exploring for oil. Most places are also extracting lots of lucrative minerals. A resource bonanza is in train across the continent, generating big government revenues and real benefits for Africans. Road networks are expanding, public services are improving. But most of this happens behind a veil of secrecy. Money sloshes out of public scrutiny at the insistence of officials and politicians who prefer it that way...

Read it all here.

Labor and petroleum in Ecuador

A new article in Focaal: 

This article analyzes the struggles of the petroleum labor movement against the neo-liberalization of the petroleum industry in Ecuador. Though originally focused on defending collective bargaining rights, since the 1990s the movement has put forward a populist, nationalist critique of the state's governance of petroleum. The article traces the roots of the movement and focuses on two contested terrains of petroleum politics, refineries and oilfields, to examine labor's role in resource governance. The article argues that by strategically joining concerns over class and nation, over a number of administrations from the 1970s to the 2000s (from populist, military juntas, to neoliberal), the petroleum labor movement became a defining actor in petroleum governance.

The Violence of Petrodollar Regimes

A new book by Luis Martinez:

The creation of oil "rents" in the 1970s put Algeria, Iraq, and Libya on the fast track to modernization. Massive revenues turned Algeria into the "Mediterranean dragon," Libya into an "emirate," and Iraq into the preeminent "rising military power" of the Arab world. From a political perspective, the progressive socialism of these countries would seem to have engendered profound, promising change: increased rights for women, positive urbanization, and improved education. Yet oil wealth's realities are beyond disillusioning. The international community now wonders whether reform can ever penetrate such nations and if the west will ever enjoy a secure gas supply. Offering the first global evaluation of these issues, Luis Martinez considers the nature of oil-sponsored violence in Algeria, Iraq, and Libya and its ability both to weaken and bolster their regimes.

Recent developments in oil markets

James Hamilton writes on Econbrowser: 

What's behind the rise in the price of Brent? Some financial reports have stressed rising tensions with Iran. However, one objective, if imperfect, quantitative measure of that comes from the market price of Intrade's contract for an imminent attack on Iran. This has moved relatively little since April.

Another reason may be that total world oil production (including natural gas liquids and biofuels) has been stagnant since January, though at a level 3-1/2 million barrels/day higher than during the Libyan cutbacks in 2011, and 2 mb/d above the pre-Libyan peak in January 2011.

I believe that the most important factor driving oil prices recently has been changing assessments of how strong the world economy will perform over the next 6 months. The decline in oil prices in April-June and the subsequent rebound is mirrored in stock indexes like the S&P500. A stronger economy should mean both higher corporate profits and higher demand for oil. Markets are apparently betting that favorable economic trends in places like the U.S. and China are enough to outweigh the discouraging numbers coming out of Europe.

The dynamic effects of resource dependence on institutional quality

Recent World Bank working paper

Are natural resources cursed? An investigation of the dynamic effects of resource dependence on institutional quality

This paper examines whether natural resource dependence has a negative influence on various indicators of institutional quality when controlling for the potential effects of other geographic, economic and cultural initial conditions. Analysis of a panel of countries from 1996 to 2010 indicates that a high degree of resource dependence, measured as the share of mineral fuel exports in a country's total exports, is associated with worse government effectiveness, as well as with reduced levels of competition across the economy. Furthermore, estimation of long-run elasticities suggests that government effectiveness and the intensity of domestic competition decrease over time as the dependence on natural resources increases. An illustration of the Russian case shows that the negative effects accumulate in the long run, leading to a worse deterioration of government effectiveness in Russia than in Canada, a country with a comparable resource endowment but far better overall institutional quality. This result is corroborated by a significant negative correlation found between regional resource dependence and an indicator of regulatory capture in Russian regions, which indicates that the regulatory environment is more likely to be subverted in regions that are more dependent on extractive industries. Overall, the findings would be consistent with a situation in which a generally weak institutional environment would allow resource interests to wield the bidding power accruing from export revenues to subvert the content of laws and regulations, as well as their enforcement. The fact that this is associated with negative externalities for the rest of the economy, notably by undermining a level playing field across non-resource sectors, sheds light on a potential channel for the resource curse.